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The Government Deference Dimension of 
Judicial Decision Making: Evidence from 
the Supreme Court of Norway
Jon Kåre Skiple* , Henrik Littleré Bentsen† and Chris Hanretty††
Past research has revealed conflicting findings regarding the degree to which judges on 
European apex courts enact their policy preferences or instead disagree on the basis of diver-
gent legal views. We investigate disagreement between judges on the Norwegian Supreme 
Court between 1996 and 2016. During this period, the court dealt with a greater volume of 
policy-relevant cases than previously. The method of appointment to the court was also changed 
to a judicial appointments commission. We analyse non-unanimous cases using item response 
theory models. We find that judges are not divided along left–right lines but instead disagree 
about the appropriate degree of deference to give to public authorities. There is no significant 
association between the appointing government and judges' ideal points either before or after 
the reform to appointments. Judges who were formerly academics are however much less def-
erential than career judges or judges who were previously lawyers in private practice.
Introduction
Judges on European supreme and constitutional courts have become in-
creasingly influential decision makers over the past thirty years. Their influ-
ence has grown thanks to domestic and international factors. Domestically, 
courts have acquired greater power over their caseload, and this has led to 
dockets that consist of fewer but more policy-relevant cases. Courts have 
also been empowered by developments in constitutional and international 
law relating to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the European Union, which increasingly dominate the issue agenda of 
European high courts (Keller & Sweet 2008; Alter 2010), giving justices new 
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opportunities to oversee public authorities (Shapiro & Stone 1994; Shapiro 
& Sweet 2002; Hirschl 2009; Martinsen 2011). The increased influence of 
these courts has drawn attention to the methods used to appoint judges to 
these courts, and to the diversity of justices’ socio-demographic and pre- 
appointment judicial careers (Shaffer et al. 2015).
The growth in the influence of European courts has led to a burgeon-
ing academic literature. This literature has been substantially aided by sys-
tematic attempts at data gathering for different apex courts (in Germany, 
through the DFG-funded project ‘The Federal Constitutional Court as a 
veto player’; in Norway, through work reported in Grendstad et al. (2015b); 
and in Israel, through the Israeli Supreme Court Database), and by the use 
of advanced techniques for the analysis of judicial behaviour (Martin & 
Quinn 2002; Clinton et al. 2004). These developments have led to multiple 
discoveries suggesting that judges’ preferences are more complicated than 
purely attitudinal or legal models suggest (Epstein & Knight 2013; Hanretty 
2015a; Arvind & Stirton 2016). For many countries, we do not yet know 
what drives disagreement between judges. We are therefore very far from 
being able to generalize about how institutions structure judicial behaviour 
across western Europe.
This paper contributes to this literature by developing a new account 
of judicial disagreement in Norway. In this paper, we make three claims 
concerning judicial behaviour on the Supreme Court of Norway. First, 
we show that most disagreement on the court is disagreement about the 
appropriate amount of deference to show to government, rather than dis-
agreement between left and right. Second, we show that judges’ views on 
deference are structured by their pre-appointment careers: judges who were 
previously academics are less likely to defer to government than judges who 
were previously in private practice or in other judicial roles. Third, we show 
that judges’ views on deference are not associated with the identity of the 
appointing government. A 2002 reform of the appointment process – which 
moved from ministerial appointment to appointment by independent com-
missions – therefore mattered more for the perception of independence than 
actual behaviour on the court. We base these three claims on the analysis 
of 644 non-unanimous cases decided by the court over a twenty-year span.
Our paper is structured in seven parts. In this first introductory section, 
we identify the principal literature to which we contribute, and the ongoing 
issues in that literature. In the section that follows (‘Context’), we describe 
the institution that we analyse, the Norwegian Supreme Court, providing 
an overview of its structure and operation. We also give reasons why the 
Norwegian Supreme Court is an interesting court to study. In a third section 
(‘Literature’), we discuss two main issues – the nature of judicial preferences 
and the link between appointment and behaviour – in the light of com-
parative and Norwegian debates. We describe the data that we use before 
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moving on to describe the method (item response theory) used to analyse 
those data. Our sixth section presents our results as they relate to individual 
judges and groups of cases. In our conclusion, we draw three implications 
for the broader study of judicial behaviour and institutional design.
Context
The Norwegian Supreme Court
The Norwegian Supreme Court was established in 1815 following the adop-
tion of the Norwegian Constitution in the previous year. The court functions 
exclusively as an appellate court. It has no original jurisdiction, and matters 
of constitutional interpretation are dealt with only in order to resolve ap-
peals before the court. The court ordinarily sits in panels of five justices. In 
more important matters, cases may be heard in a grand chamber (11 judges) 
or in a plenary session (19 judges). Since 1863, judges have had the opportu-
nity to publicly express their individual opinions through dissents and con-
currences (Mestad 2015). Because Norway’s legal culture mixes the civil 
law system’s reliance upon codes, laws and statutes with the common law 
system’s reliance on judges and precedents (von Eyben 1956; Sunde 2015), 
Norwegian justices have the opportunity to take a more active role in policy 
making and the development of law than most of their civil law counter-
parts (Skiple et al. 2016).
As a generalist apex court that decides cases concerning constitutional 
issues as part of a broader caseload, the Norwegian court is more similar 
to apex courts in common law legal systems than specialized constitutional 
courts in Central and Eastern Europe. Because the court has the compe-
tence to review the legality of an administrative action and to determine the 
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament (i.e., judicial review), the court has an 
important position in the political system (Magnussen 2005).
Appointments to the Court
Until 2002, the judges of the Supreme Court were appointed by the King-
in-Council, acting on the recommendation of the Ministry of Justice. This 
system was similar to the systems of ministerial appointment found in 
several common law countries (Hanretty 2015b). In 2001, the Norwegian 
Parliament approved reforms to the court system which also changed the 
system for appointing judges to the Supreme Court. Since 2002, judges have 
been appointed by the King-in-Council acting upon the recommendation of 
a seven-member Judicial Appointments Board. The Judicial Appointments 
Board must be made up of ‘three judges, one lawyer, one lawyer in public ser-
vice, and two non-lawyers’ (Grendstad et al. 2015b, 47). The Appointments 
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Board announces vacancies, vets applicants and makes a final recommen-
dation by ranking the top candidates (Sunde 2015). No government has 
failed to follow the Board’s recommendations. Because justices serve until 
a mandatory retirement age of 70, appointments to the court are naturally 
staggered, and our data include votes from justices appointed substantially 
before and after the 2002 reform.
Cases Heard by the Court
As a general appellate court, the court hears a variety of cases. Its case-
load in the period studied here (1996–2016) is, however, quite different to 
its caseload earlier in the court’s history. In 1995, a reform of the criminal 
procedures relieved the Court of the heavy burden of serving as a default 
court of appeals for minor criminal cases, leading to a significantly lighter 
caseload (Sunde 2015). This coincided with gradual institutional reform in 
civil procedures. The combined effect was to grant the court near-complete 
discretionary power over its docket. These changes lead to a lower caseload 
composed of more policy-consequential cases, which, in turn, was followed 
by an increase in dissents on the court (Bentsen 2018). More broadly, the 
reform enabled the court to concentrate on its agenda around appeals that 
raise issues of importance beyond the present case to fulfil its function as a 
court of precedent that – through its caselaw – works towards clarification 
and development of law. Thus, the litmus test for granting leave to appeal is 
whether there is ‘something to gain for the legal system and for the society 
as a whole’ (Bårdsen 2018, 11).
A fair share of cases on the court deals with constitutional issues, either 
as questions concerning judicial review of acts of parliament (decided in 
plenary), reviewing the constitutionality of administrative actions or using 
constitutional arguments to interpret and apply statutory law (Bårdsen 
2017). The court very rarely exercises judicial review to its fullest effect (i.e., 
finding a law unconstitutional); however, in 2010 the court set aside laws 
enacted by the parliament in three cases, thereby demonstrating the court’s 
power to perform judicial review. In the plenary decision in the Ship Owner 
Taxation case (casenumber: Rt-2010-143), the court held – by a majority of 
six to five – that a tax law enacted by the parliament violated the prohibition 
against retroactive legislation in Article 97 of the Norwegian Constitution, 
consequently barring the government from collecting a potential tax income 
of 21 billion NOK (USD 3.547 bn) (Grendstad et al. 2015b, 166).
The Supreme Court and International Courts
The Supreme Court coexists with two international juridical regimes. First, 
following the 1994 ratification of the European Economic Area (EEA) agree-
ment, the Supreme Court must follow decisions of the Court of Justice of the 
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European Free Trade Association States (the EFTA Court) in matters relat-
ing to the European single market, and may refer issues to the court where 
the relevant provisions are unclear. Because the single-market legislation is 
EU legislation, and because the EFTA court follows the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), this means that the Supreme 
Court also must have awareness of developments in that court. Second, the 
Human Rights Act of 1999 incorporated the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into domestic Norwegian law, in practice oblig-
ing the Supreme Court to heed the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). In 2014, the constitution was amended to include a 
new chapter on human rights. This raises the possibility that the court could 
develop its own autochtonous human rights jurisprudence. Generally, devel-
opments since the 1990s have meant that international law has become a sub-
stantial part of the agenda of the court, giving justices new opportunities to 
exercise control over public authorities (Wiklund 2008; Martinsen 2011).
Justifying the Study of the Court
Having described the court and its operation, we can now better justify our 
decision to analyse judicial behaviour on the court. Four characteristics of 
the court make it an exciting case to study. First, by identifying and charac-
terizing the bases of judicial disagreement on a generalist apex court, we 
add to the growing literature on apex courts in Europe, which have mainly 
been concerned with specialized constitutional courts (e.g., Hönnige 2009; 
Pellegrina & Garoupa 2013; Coroado et al. 2017; Pellegrina et al. 2017; De 
Jaegere 2019; Popelier & Bielen 2019). Second, the change in the court’s 
docket means that policy-relevant cases are much more common. This in 
turn makes it more likely that policy preferences will emerge in a distinct 
form (Hall 1985; Brace et al. 2012). Alternately, if policy preferences do not 
emerge, it will not be for a lack of opportunity. Third, the presence of interna-
tional agreements allows for a specific type of policy preference to emerge, 
namely a centre–periphery domestic/supra-national cleavage (Malecki 
2012; Voeten 2007). Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the change in 
the appointment mechanism allows for a test of the effect of different in-
stitutions upon judges’ preferences. We describe some of the expectations 
relating to appointment institutions in the section which follows.
Literature
The Nature of Judicial Preferences
It is common in the study of judicial behaviour to explain what judges do by 
pointing to their preferences (Epstein & Knight 2013). Although the range 
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of possible preferences is broad, many influential studies have focused 
on judges’ policy preferences on the same left–right scale that structures 
party politics in many countries. Judges may either straightforwardly enact 
those preferences (the attitudinal model: Segal & Spaeth 2002) or may be 
constrained (the strategic model: Bergara et al. 2003; Brouard & Hönnige 
2017). These preferences are either inferred from patterns of judicial (dis)
agreement, or they are inferred from the position of the actor appointing 
each judge. These kinds of inferences are found whenever appointing party 
is used as a proxy for judicial preferences. Previous studies which have in-
ferred judges’ preferences on a left–right scale have included multiple stud-
ies of the US Supreme Court (Martin & Quinn 2002) and American state 
supreme courts (Windett et al. 2015), as well as studies of European consti-
tutional courts (Hanretty 2012, 2014). This focus on left/right preferences in 
political science is understandable: the left/right spectrum structures most 
of electoral politics in advanced industrial democracies, and political scien-
tists who are interested in courts tend to be most interested in ‘politicised’ 
courts, which are more likely to reflect the same preference structures found 
in electoral politics.
Preferences beyond Left and Right
There is, however, an emerging literature on other kinds of preferences 
which, although they are political, are less obviously connected to the main 
dimensions of political conflict. Scholars of judicial politics in western 
Europe ought to be more attuned to these possibilities, since two regional 
courts in the CJEU and the ECtHR demonstrate judicial preferences that 
are not left/right preferences but are closer to centre/periphery preferences 
(Malecki 2012; Voeten 2007). In other (national) courts, there is evidence 
that, although judges’ preferences can be distinguished, these preferences 
relate to the appropriate degree of deference to give to public authorities – 
preferences which are partly political (insofar as they relate to the appropri-
ate degree of state intervention) and partly legal (Arvind & Stirton 2016) – 
or to the appropriate degree of support to give to plaintiffs rather than 
respondents (Hanretty 2015a). It is not yet clear whether apex courts in 
Western Europe more closely follow the model of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, where left/right preferences are paramount, or whether 
instead they are characterized by subtler political differences.
Appointments and Preferences
The literature on judicial preferences has little in common with the litera-
ture on appointment methods. This literature is most strongly related to the 
theme of judicial independence, although it has occasionally been hard to 
link merit-based or depoliticized appointment mechanisms (a component 
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of most measures of de jure judicial independence) to de facto judicial in-
dependence (Melton & Ginsburg 2014). There is good evidence that differ-
ent systems lead to judges with different observable characteristics: Valdini 
and Shortell (2016) show that ‘exposed’ appointment mechanisms (where 
appointments are made by publicly accountable actors such as elected pol-
iticians) are associated with a greater proportion of female appointees than 
‘sheltered’ appointment mechanisms (where appointments are made by 
merit-based appointments commissions). Insofar as judicial characteristics 
can affect preferences (Tate 1981), this might be the basis for a link. The 
closest to a direct test of the link between appointment mechanisms and the 
structure of judicial preferences is Weinshall et al. (2018), who, in a study 
of decision making on five apex courts in the US, Canada, Israel, India and 
the Philippines find some support for the claim that ‘when the appointment 
process involves other players in addition to the political branches of gov-
ernment – for instance in the form of judicial appointment committees con-
sisting of both politicians and legal professionals – appointments… yield a 
less attitudinal bench’ (Weinshall et al. 2018, 341; see also Carroll & Tiede 
2011).
The Norwegian Debate
The preceding paragraphs have discussed the English language social sci-
entific literature on judicial behaviour. In the country we study, there is 
an ample debate about how best to characterize decision making on the 
Norwegian Supreme Court, and regarding the effects of changes to methods 
of appointment. Part of this discussion has involved the real effect of the 
2002 reform to the method of appointment. The intention of the reform was 
to eliminate any politicized appointments to the court. Statements by for-
mer ministers of justice on appointments, as well as de facto appointments 
of former ministers of justice to the Court demonstrate that well before 
2002, the government could have used the appointment process to place 
ideologically like-minded justices on the Court (Grendstad et al. 2015b, 
ch. 2). In contrast, through interviews and historical data, Sunde (2015, ch. 
12) argues that the appointment process before 2002 was not influenced 
by ideological considerations. Rather, Sunde argues, the process reflects a 
modest degree of self-recruitment by the Supreme Court on the basis of 
candidates’ legal credentials. The Chief Justice meets the Minister of justice 
on a regular basis, and the Chief is always permitted to offer views on the 
applicants before their final appointment.
There is a partly related debate about the background of justices, and 
the effects of these personal attributes on judges’ behaviour. Several schol-
ars have argued that different backgrounds affect judges’ deference. One 
dominant position holds that justices with pre-appointment careers in 
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 43 – No. 4, 2020 271
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on 
behalf of Nordic Political Science Association
government administration are more inclined than other justices to defer to 
the public party (Lund 1987; Kjønstad 1997, 1999). Some empirical studies 
bear this out (Grendstad et al. 2015a, 2015b; Skiple 2015; Skiple et al. 2016). 
A second position holds that academics are more likely to challenge the 
government. Studies of the Norwegian Supreme Court identify a number 
of legal academics on the Supreme Court as being among those expressing 
a stronger desire to ‘make law’. They actively use the constitution as a legal 
force and vigorously pursue Norway’s commitment to international law and 
human rights (Kinander 2016; Robberstad 2016), and are generally more 
prone to disagreement (Bentsen 2018).
Data
Scope
We use data from all non-unanimous cases decided by the Supreme Court 
of Norway between January 1996 and December 2015 in panels of five, 11 or 
19 judges. We only use non-unanimous cases because (without very strong 
assumptions) unanimous cases are uninformative about the nature of dis-
agreement on the court in item response theory models (Martin & Quinn 
2002, 137fn3). We use decisions after 1996 because this was the first full year 
following the reforms to the court’s caseload which eliminated a large num-
ber of routine criminal appeals. We use decisions until 2016 because this is 
the last year for which we have full data. In total, we analyse data from 644 
cases decided by 47 judges. We omit judges who sat on these cases but who 
decided fewer than 10 cases. The resulting total number of justice votes is 
3,458.
Data Collection and Coding
We use data from Norwegian Supreme Court Database (Grendstad et al. 
2015b). Decisions are manually collected by the NSCD team from the judi-
cial text database Lovdata.no. Judge appointments, careers and background 
are collected from the National Archives of Norway and historical and con-
temporary sources. All variables in NSCD have been coded according to 
predefined codebooks. From NSCD we gathered variables on judges’ votes, 
appointments and careers, case parties, case winner, issue type and panel 
size from 1996 to 2016. In addition, we complemented NSCD data with three 
variables: constitutional cases, criminal sentencing cases and judges’ main ca-
reers. To identify (1) constitutional and (2) criminal sentencing cases, we (1) 
searched decisions for legal references to the Constitution (‘Grunnloven’) 
and (2) searched the keyword section of the decision for criminal sentenc-
ing (‘straffutmåling’) and community sentencing (‘samfunnsstraff’). We did 
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both searches on a text corpus of the decisions extracted from Lovdata.
no using domstolr (Bjørnebekk & Johannesson 2016). We collected data 
on main pre-appointment career from judges’ official bios on the supreme 
court’s webpage and the Norwegian Encyclopedia. We counted the num-
ber of years each judge had worked in either government administration, 
private law firms, lower courts or academia. The occupation with highest 
number of years was coded as the judge’s main occupation.
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our analysis is whether or not the relevant judge 
voted with the majority or dissented. By a ‘dissent’ we include both dis-
agreement with the outcome and disagreement in reasoning. Around 30 
percent of the 3,458 votes are dissents, and the majority of cases only fea-
ture one dissenting vote. By convention we record votes with the majority 
as having a value of one, and dissenting votes as having a value of zero, but 
nothing depends on this decision.
Case-level Variables
We use eight case-level variables. These are as follows:
• whether the outcome in a civil case, meaning the broader category of 
non-criminal cases, was favourable (102 cases) or unfavourable (86) for 
the public authority, or neither (both sides were private or both sides 
were public);
• whether the outcome in a case involving the European Convention on 
Human Rights was favourable (48 cases) or unfavourable (44) for the 
public authority, or neither (both sides were private or both sides were 
public);
• whether the outcome in a case involving a reference to European Union 
(EU) law or directives to case law from the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) was favourable (9 cases) or unfavourable (18) for the public au-
thority, or neither (both sides were private or both sides were public);
• whether the outcome in a criminal case was favourable (109 cases) for 
the prosecutor or for the defendant (131);
• whether the outcome in a criminal sentencing adjustment case was fa-
vourable (65 cases) for the prosecutor or for the defendant (76);
• whether or not the outcome in a case involving a reference to the con-
stitution was favourable (23 cases) or unfavourable (21) for the public 
authority, or neither (both sides were private or both sides were public);
• whether or not the outcome in a case involving economic matters was 
favourable (52 cases) or unfavourable (53) for the public authority;
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• whether or not the outcome in a case heard by a larger (11 judges or 
more) panel was favourable (9 cases) or unfavourable (14) for the public 
authority, or neither (both sides were private or both sides were public).
Either of these variables is scored 1 if the outcome was favourable to 
the public authority (or prosecutor), −1 if the outcome was unfavourable 
for the public authority; and 0 if the outcome does not apply (for example 
the variable asks about outcomes in civil cases, but the case is a criminal 
law case), if neither side was a public authority, or if both sides were public 
authorities. By outcome favourable to public authority (or prosecutor), we 
mean any case where a public authority (or prosecutor) appealed, where 
the respondent was not a public authority (or prosecutor), and where the 
appeal was allowed, or alternately where a public authority (or prosecutor) 
was the respondent, where the appellant was not a public authority (or pros-
ecutor), and where the appeal was dismissed.
We included these eight case-level variables as they offer a basis of what 
may drive divisions on the court. A deference division in civil cases and 
constitutional issues (e.g., Grendstad et al. 2015b), a globalist/nationalist 
division in cases concerning ECHR and EU/EEA (e.g., Malecki 2012), a 
left–right division in economic cases (e.g., Grendstad et al. 2015b; Skiple et 
al. 2016) and a soft-on-crime versus hard-on-crime in criminal law and crim-
inal sentencing cases (e.g., Grendstad et al. 2015b). We include cases decided 
in enlarged panels to account for the possibility that the more principled 
or consequential cases decided in these panels activate a higher degree of 
division between the justices.
Judge-level Variables
We include three variables which relate to judges. These are as follows:
• whether or not the judge was appointed by a social democratic gov-
ernment (code: 1; 30 judges) or a conservative government (code: 0; 17 
judges);
• whether or not the judge was appointed after (code: 1; 19 judges) the 
2002 reform of the appointment system, or before (code: 0, 28 judges); 
and
• whether the judge’s primary pre-appointment career was spent in gov-
ernment administration (23 judges), as a private attorney (10), as a low-
er-court judge (5), or as an academic (9 judges; the reference category).
In the Appendix we also show models which include information on the 
judge’s gender (14 of 47 judges were female); whether or not they were born 
in Oslo (22 were); whether or not they served as a temporary judge; and (for 
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judges previously in government administration) whether they worked in 




We analyse judges’ votes using a hierarchical item response theory (IRT) 
model. IRT models are a common way of analysing votes from delibera-
tive bodies like legislatures and courts. IRT models attempt to find judge 
positions (along some dimension) that best explain the observed pattern 
of votes. Ordinarily, judges who agree with each other more are more likely 
to have positions which are closer together on this ‘recovered dimension’, 
and judges who disagree more with each other are more likely to be further 
apart. IRT models, however, use more information than just rates of agree-
ment, because they also allow for the relationship between each case and 
the recovered dimension to vary: some cases will have high absolute values 
of a ‘case discrimination parameter’ (analogous to a high factor loading in 
factor analysis). These highly discriminating cases will provide an insight 
into the nature of the recovered dimension, which is not fixed by the model 
but which must, once recovered, be interpreted by the analyst.
IRT and Testing Expectations
IRT models are compact summaries of patterns on the court under a par-
ticular model of decision making. As such, they are primarily descriptive 
rather than hypothetico-deductive. The language used in the previous sec-
tion, describing independent and dependent variables, is therefore partly 
misleading. It is, however, possible to incorporate tests of relationships 
within IRT models, by modelling some of the parameters in the model as 
functions of other covariates. In this way, it becomes possible to test the 
(judge-level) relationship between appointing governments and judge ideal 
points; or to test the (case-level) relationship between the direction of a 
public law case (for or against the government) and the sign of the discrim-
ination parameter.
The model can be specified as follows. Let yij stand for the vote of judge 
j (1,...,47) in case i (1,...,644), where yij=1 when the judge votes with the 
majority, and yij=0 when the judge dissents. The probability of the judge 
joining with the majority is modelled as a function of a judge ideal point (j), 
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For cases with a positive discrimination parameter (𝛽i>0), judges who 
have higher values of  (either ‘more’ of the latent trait, or judges positioned 
on the right-hand or easterly side of the recovered dimension) will be more 
likely to vote with the majority. For cases with a negative discrimination 
parameter, it is judges with lower values of  who will be more likely to end 
up in the majority.
Ours is a hierarchical IRT Model
This means that the case discrimination parameters are in turn modelled as 
the product of different covariates and associated coefficients. Specifically, 
we model
where X is a matrix containing an intercept and the eight case-level indepen-
dent variables listed above. Modelling the case discrimination parameters in 
this way has three advantages. First, it makes our estimates more precise 
because we are able to exploit extra information about our cases. Second, 
it helps in the interpretation of the recovered dimension. If the  coeffi-
cients are all positive and distinct from zero, then it means that pro-public 
outcomes are associated with higher values of the latent trait – or alter-
nately, that the recovered dimension involves deference to public authori-
ties. Third, it helps us better ground comparisons across time (Ho & Quinn 
2010, 845). Some of the judges in our sample never served together, and so 
we do not have direct evidence of their rates of agreement. For any pair of 
judges, we can identify a bridging judge or judges who served with both. 
However, if the set of cases decided by those sets of judges changes, these 
bridges can be poor bridges. By linking the case discrimination parameters 
to outcomes, we can be more confident about how judge positions relate to 
observable case outcomes. This does not solve the problem of intertemporal 
comparisons – the meaning and nature of ruling in a pro-Convention right 
direction can also change over time – but it does reduce it.
In common with most researchers using IRT models in political science, 
we estimate this model using Bayesian methods, and specifically using Stan 
(Stan Development Team 2018). We use different weakly informative prior 
distributions for our parameters. The location parameters () are drawn 
from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
10. The coefficients on the case-level covariates () are drawn from a Cauchy 
distribution with a location parameter set to zero and a scale parameter set 
to 10 for the intercept and 2.5 for all other parameters (Gelman et al. 2008). 
The residual standard deviation on the case discrimination parameters () 
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points are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and a standard 
deviation of one. To identify the model, we set one justice to have a positive 
idea point and one justice to have a negative ideal point. We set Justice Jens 
Edvin Skoghøy to have a positive ideal point, as he is identified as being 
more defiant towards the elected branches of government, and set Justice 
Ingse Stabel to have a negative ideal point because she is identified as 
being more deferential to the elected branches of government (Grendstad 
et al. 2015b, 11). Both Justice Skoghøy (1998–2016) and Stabel (2001–2017) 
served on the court for the majority of the period analysed in this paper. 
They also represent two different judicial pre-appointment careers and 
were appointed by different governments. Whereas Justice Skoghøy spent 
most of his pre-appointment career in the university as a law professor and 
was appointed by a conservative government, Justice Stabel spent most of 
her pre-appointment career working in government administration and was 
appointed by a social democratic government.
Results
The principal output of an IRT analysis of voting in political institutions is 
a graph which shows the relative positions of the actors casting those votes. 
This graph helps make sense of the recovered dimension. Before that graph 
can be shown, however, it is necessary to know whether the IRT model pro-
vides a good fit to the data – or at least, a better fit than a reasonable null 
model. If the model does not provide a good or acceptable fit to the data, 
then little store can be set by the ideal points recovered by that model. Two 
measures of fit are the percentage of decisions correctly predicted (PCP) 
and the geometric mean probability of model predictions (GMP). Both of 
these measures run from zero to one, where higher values indicate better fit. 
PCP is the simpler measure, but unlike GMP it does not take into account 
whether correct predictions were assigned a very high probability or a prob-
ability only just greater than 50 percent. Fortunately, both measures of fit 
agree that the IRT model outperforms the null model. The PCP for the 
IRT model is 74.7 percent. This compares favourably to the PCP of a null 
model which simply states that each judge always votes with the majority. 
This null model has a PCP of 69.4 percent (which is simply the proportion 
of votes cast with the majority). The GMP of the IRT model is 0.705, which 
compares to the GMP of a null model which states that each judge proba-
bilistically votes with the majority with probability 0.694. The GMP for this 
null is 0.54.
Having established that the fit of the IRT model improves on the fit of a 
null model, we can move on to graphing the judges’ positions on the recov-
ered dimension. These positions are shown in Figure 1, together with 90 
percent credible intervals surrounding each point estimate. The two judges 
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chosen as anchor judges (Skoghøy and Stabel) are located far apart towards 
each end of the recovered dimension. Since these judges have previously 
been identified as being activist and deferential respectively, this gives ini-
tial support for the claim that the recovered dimension separates deferen-
tial from less-deferential judges. However, they are not the most extreme 
judges: judge Endresen is clearly further to the ‘left’ than judge Stabel, and 
judge Zimmer is clearly to the ‘right’ of judge Skoghøy. The ideal points 
are relatively precisely estimated, which means it is possible to distinguish 
clearly between positions even of judges in the middle of the spectrum (say, 
between the position of Tore Schei and Karenanne Gussgard).
In order to interpret better the recovered dimension, we next look at the 
coefficients associated with the case discrimination parameters. These are 
Figure 1. Judge ideal points according to appointing government and appointment before 
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plotted in Figure 2. Where the coefficient is positive, cases with this feature 
are more likely to feature judges from the right-hand side of the recovered 
dimension (e.g., judges Skoghøy, Carsten Smith and Zimmer) in the major-
ity; where the coefficient is negative, cases with this feature are more likely 
to feature judges from the opposite side of the recovered dimension.
There is a strong negative association, clearly distinguishable from zero, 
between pro-public findings in civil cases and the discrimination parameter. 
This association is similar in size to the association between pro-public find-
ings in constitutional cases – although this association is less precisely esti-
mated, and as such not significantly different from zero. This suggests that 
judges on the left-hand side of the recovered dimension (Stabel; Clement 
Endresen) are more likely to be deferential – that is deliver rulings in favour 
of public authorities.
We argue that the recovered dimension is associated with deference to 
public authorities, rather than a left/right or centre–periphery cleavage. The 
coefficients associated with pro-public authority rulings in cases relating to 
economic matters (which Grendstad et al. (2015b) take to be indication of 
left/right preferences) are not significantly different from zero. Nor are the 
coefficients associated with ECHR or EEA matters. Indeed, these coeffi-
cients have different signs, which is not what one would expect if the recov-
ered dimension separated ‘localist’ from ‘globalist’ judges.
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Having identified the recovered dimension as a ‘deference’ dimension, 
we can now move on to look at the effect of appointments, and the change 
in appointment mechanism, on judges’ ideal points (Table 1). Generally, 
there is no relationship between the identity of the appointing govern-
ment and judges’ ideal points: the average ideal point of judges appointed 
by Social Democratic led governments is −0.12 (SD = 0.82), compared to 
−0.17 (SD = 1.18) for all other governments, a difference which is not sta-
tistically significant. Nor is there any difference between pre- and post-re-
form appointments: pre-reform appointments have an average ideal point 
of −0.16 (SD = .89) compared to a figure of −0.16 for post-reform appoint-
ments (SD = 1.07). Finally, there is no evidence that the relationship between 
the identity of the appointing government and judge ideal points changed 
before and after the reform: a regression model which includes an interac-
tion between appointing government and reform shows no significant effects, 
and the model in total explains almost no variation in judicial ideal points.
We are, however, able to explain part of the variation in judicial ideal 
points by pointing to judicial backgrounds. Relative to the reference cate-
gory of academics, judges with a previous judicial background, or a previous 
background in private legal practice, have ideal points that are much more 
negative – which means much more deferential. Phrased differently, aca-
demics are much more likely to rule against the government than career 
judges or lawyers. Surprisingly, individuals who made their career within 
Table 1. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models of Judicial Ideal Points as a Function of 
Appointing Actor (Models 1, 2) and Previous Career (Model 3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Appointed under Soc-Dem govt 0.063 0.404
(0.300) (0.366)
Appointed after 2002 reform −0.051 0.611
(0.294) (0.510)
Soc.-Dem appointee post-2002 reform −0.975
(0.619)
Formerly lawyer in private practice −1.036*
(0.418)




Num. Obs. 47 47 47
R2 0.001 0.056 0.150
Adj. R2 −0.044 −0.010 0.091
AIC 135.8 135.1 130.2
BIC 143.2 144.4 139.5
Log. Lik. −63.892 −62.571 −60.111
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
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government (typically the Ministry of Justice), and who might have been 
expected to have been more deferential, cannot be distinguished on average 
from academics. These factors explain around a quarter of the variation that 
we see in judicial ideal points.
Conclusions
In this article we have analysed disagreement on the Norwegian Supreme 
Court over a period of twenty years. This was a period in which disagree-
ment rose, and in which the court decided to focus on cases with greater pol-
icy content. At the beginning of this period, the court was also appointed by 
the government. These are all factors which might reasonably have been ex-
pected to lead to the same left–right preferences which structure Norwegian 
politics expressing themselves on the court. Instead we have found that the 
single-best interpretation of division on the court lies in judges’ differing 
approaches to the claims of public bodies, and the appropriate amount of 
deference to show to these authorities. These more-or-less deferential atti-
tudes are structured by judges’ personal attributes – former academics are 
much less deferential than career judges or lawyers from private practice. 
In this sense, ‘who sits’ matters. However, the system used to appoint seems 
not to matter, for we observed no significant differences before and after 
the 2002 reform to the appointment system.
The first implication of this research is that it is possible to explain judges’ 
behaviour by drawing inferences about their preferences, and that explain-
ing judicial behaviour using the techniques of item response theory does 
not mean assuming that judges are merely legislators in robes. We have not 
found that judges are divided between left- and right-wing judges, in the 
way that we might if judges were actually legislators in robes. The division 
that we have found – between judges who are (comparatively) deferen-
tial towards public authorities and judges who are not – is based on dis-
agreement that is partly political and partly legal. Although our method of 
analysis has in the past often been used to substantiate claims about judges 
having strong political preferences, nothing in the method determines such 
a finding, and we expect that, as the comparative analysis of judicial dis-
agreement in Western Europe develops, other courts will soon be shown to 
demonstrate similar, less obviously political patterns of disagreement.
Second, our findings provide support for a personal attributes model 
of judicial behaviour, with particular support for an account emphasizing 
judges’ career trajectories. In this paper we are not able to identify the mech-
anism that makes academics less deferential, but past research has shown 
that former academics on international courts are more activist (Bruinsma 
2006; cf. Jodoin 2010). Our finding therefore builds on past research.
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Third, our findings have significant implications for institutional reform. The 
2002 reform to appointments to the Supreme Court was intended to depoliti-
cize appointments. We have shown that it did not matter, not least because there 
was no strong appointer–appointee relationship to begin with. We acknowledge 
that the 2002 reform might not have had an effect because Norwegian politi-
cians did not need constraining, and therefore that the effects of moving from 
ministerial to merit-based appointment may vary depending on the initial con-
ditions. Like Weiden (2011), we would suggest that selection culture, rather than 
formal appointment procedures, matters for the link between appointments 
and behaviour. This finding urges researchers to think twice before employing 
justices’ appointing authorities as a proxy for their ideological preferences.
We see this article as part of a broader cumulative process of identifying 
and characterizing the bases of judicial disagreement on West European apex 
courts. This process is a necessary precursor to explaining why some courts 
are divided into left- and right-wing blocks whilst other courts are divided 
by matters that seem more exclusively legal in nature. Given the broader 
cultural similarities between the countries, we expect that disagreement in 
other Scandinavian apex courts can be characterized in the same way – but 
this would merely accentuate a puzzle we have already identified, namely 
why apex courts which at one point in time have been subject to fairly direct 
ministerial appointment should have resisted politicization in this way. Our 
findings thus call for further research into the conditions under which judicial 
appointment systems shape the bases of judicial disagreement on apex courts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Gunnar Grendstad, the SPS editor and anonymous reviewers 
for helpful feedback. Data and code to replicate our results is available at: 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DEVMTI.
REFERENCES
Alter, K. J. 2010. Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Arvind, T. T. & Stirton, L. 2016. ‘Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the UK’s Top Judges’, 
Public Law, 2016(July), 418–36.
Bentsen, H. L. 2018. ‘Court Leadership, Agenda Transformation, and Judicial Dissent: A European 
Case of a “Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms”’, Journal of Law and Courts, 6(1), 189–213.
Bergara, M., Richman, B. & Spiller, P. T. 2003. ‘Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision 
Making: The Congressional Constraint’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 28(2), 247–80.
Bjørnebekk, O. & Johannesson, M. 2016. ‘Domstolr’, GitHub Repository. https://github.com/
bearcreek/domstolr
Brace, P., Yates, J. & Boyea, B. D. 2012. ‘Judges, Litigants, and the Design of Courts’, Law & 
Society Review, 46(3), 497–522. https://github.com/bearc reek/domstolr
Brouard, S. & Hönnige, C. 2017. ‘Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Lessons from the 
United States, France and Germany’, European Journal of Political Research, 56(3), 529–52.
Bruinsma, F. J.2006. ‘Judicial identities in the European Court of Human Rights’, in Van Hoek, 
A., Hol, T., Jansen, O., Rijpkema, P. & Widdershoven, R. eds, Multilevel Governance in 
Enforcement and Adjudication. Intersentia, 203–40.
282  Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 43 – No. 4, 2020
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on  
behalf of Nordic Political Science Association
Bårdsen, A. 2017. ‘The Norwegian Supreme Court as the Guardian of Constitutional Rights 
and Freedoms’. Presentation at “Norway in Europe”, Centre for European Law, Oslo, 18 
September. https://www.domst ol.no/globa lasse ts/uploa d/hret/artik ler-og-fored rag/supre me-
court ---const ituti onal-right s---bards en180 92017.pdf
Bårdsen, A. 2018. ‘Deciding What to Decide: The Filtering Mechanism in the Norwegian 
Supreme Court’. Presentation at Icelandic Icelandic Bar Association, Reykjavik, 16 February. 
https://www.domst ol.no/globa lasse ts/uploa d/hret/artik ler-og-fored rag/decid ing-what-to-de-
cid e---bards en-23.02.2018.pdf
Carroll, R. & Tiede, L. 2011. ‘Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal’, Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies, 8(4), 856–77.
Clinton, J., Jackman, S. & Rivers, D. 2004. ‘The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data’, American 
Political Science Review, 98(2), 355–70.
Coroado, S., Garoupa, N. & Magalhães, P. C. 2017. ‘Judicial Behavior under Austerity: An 
Empirical Analysis of Behavioral Changes in the Portuguese Constitutional Court, 2002–
2016’, Journal of Law and Courts, 5(2), 289–311.
De Jaegere, J. 2019. Judicial Review and Strategic Behaviour: An Empirical Case Law Analysis 
of the Belgian Constitutional Court. Cambrigde: Intersentia.
Epstein, L. & Knight, J. 2013. ‘Reconsidering Judicial Preferences’, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 16, 11–31.
Gelman, A., Jakulin, A., Pittau, M. G. & Su, Y.-S. 2008. ‘A Weakly Informative Default Prior 
Distribution for Logistic and Other Regression Models’, The Annals of Applied Statistics, 
2(4), 1360–83.
Grendstad, G., Shaffer, W. R., Skiple, J. K. & Waltenburg, E. N. 2015a. ‘Statsvennlighet i norges 
høyesterett 1963–2013’, Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift, 31(4), 305–32.
Grendstad, G., Shaffer, W. R. & Waltenburg, E. N. 2015b. Policy Making in an Independent 
Judiciary: The Norwegian Supreme Court. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Hall, M. G. 1985. ‘Docket Control as an Influence on Judicial Voting’, Justice System Journal, 
10, 243–55.
Hanretty, C. 2012. ‘Dissent in Iberia: The Ideal Points of Justices on the Spanish and Portuguese 
Constitutional Tribunals’, European Journal of Political Research, 51(5), 671–92.
Hanretty, C. 2014. ‘The Bulgarian Constitutional Court as an Additional Legislative Chamber’, 
East European Politics and Societies, 28(3), 540–58.
Hanretty, C. 2015a. ‘Judicial Disagreement Need Not Be Political: Dissent on the Estonian 
Supreme Court’, Europe-Asia Studies, 67(6), 970–88.
Hanretty, C. 2015b. ‘The Appointment of Judges by Ministers: Political Preferment in England, 
1880–2005’, Journal of Law and Courts, 3(2), 305–29.
Hirschl, R. 2009. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ho, D. E. & Quinn, K. M. 2010. ‘How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, 
Measurement, and Models’, California Law Review, 98(3), 813–76.
Hönnige, C. (2009) The Electoral Connection: How the Pivotal Jugde Affects Oppositional 
Success at European Constitutional Courts. West European Politics, 32(5), 963–984.
Jodoin, S. 2010. ‘Understanding the Behavior of International Courts: An Examination of 
Decision-making at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals’, Journal of International 
Law and International Relations, 6, 1.
Keller, H. & Sweet, A. S. 2008. A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kinander, M. 2016. ‘Fra tilbakeholdenhet til aktivisme: Nyere utviklingslinjer i forholdet mel-
lom rett og politikk i høyesterett’, Lov og Rett, 55(3), 141–64.
Kjønstad, A. 1997. ‘Trygderettigheter, grunnloven og høyesterett’, Lov og Rett, 36(5), 243–92.
Kjønstad, A. 1999. ‘Er høyesterett statsvennlig?’, Lov og Rett, 38(2), 97–122.
Lund, K. 1987. ‘Kontroll av staten i statens egne domstoler’, Lov og Rett, 26(4), 211–27.
Magnussen, A.-M. 2005. ‘The Norwegian Supreme Court and Equitable Considerations: 
Problematic Aspects of Legal Reasoning’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 28(1), 69–89.
Malecki, M. 2012. ‘Do ECJ Judges All Speak with the Same Voice? Evidence of Divergent 
Preferences from the Judgments of Chambers’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19(1), 
59–75.
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 43 – No. 4, 2020 283
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on 
behalf of Nordic Political Science Association
Martin, A. D. & Quinn, K. M. 2002. ‘Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999’, Political Analysis, 10(2), 134–53.
Martinsen, D. S. 2011. ‘Judicial Policy-making and Europeanization: The Proportionality of 
National Control and Administrative Discretion’, Journal of European Public Policy, 18(7), 
944–61.
Melton, J. & Ginsburg, T. 2014. ‘Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter? A Reevaluation 
of Explanations for Judicial Independence’, Journal of Law and Courts, 2(2), 187–217.
Mestad, O.2015. ‘Dissensens alvor: Om nyare dissensar i høgsterett’, in Schei, T., Skoghøy, J. 
E. A. & Øie, T. eds, Lov, sannhet, rett: Norges høyesterett 200 ar. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
222–253.
Pellegrina, L. D., De Mot, J., Faure, M. & Garoupa, N. 2017. ‘Litigating Federalism: An Empirical 
Analysis of Decisions of the Belgian Constitutional Court’, European Constitutional Law 
Review, 13(2), 305–46.
Pellegrina, L. D. & Garoupa, N. 2013. ‘Choosing between the Government and the Regions: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court Decisions’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 52(4), 558–80.
Popelier, P. & Bielen, S. 2019. ‘How Courts Decide Federalism Disputes: Legal Merit, Attitudinal 
Effects, and Strategic Considerations in the Jurisprudence of the Belgian Constitutional 
Court’, The Journal of Federalism, 49(4), 587–616.
Robberstad, A. 2016. ‘Viljen til å skape lov og grunnlov’, Lov og Rett, 55(1), 49–64.
Segal, J. A. & Spaeth, H. J. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shaffer, W. R., Grendstad, G. & Waltenburg, E. N. 2015. ‘Is Diversity Just For Show? Diversity 
and Appointment to the Norwegian Supreme Court 1945–2011’, Raetferd, 38(1), 18–42.
Shapiro, M. & Stone, A. 1994. ‘The New Constitutional Politics of Europe’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 26(4), 397–420.
Shapiro, M. & Sweet, A. S. 2002. On Law, Politics, and Judicialization. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Skiple, J. K. 2015. ‘Ei konkret vurdering i kvart enkelt tilfelle. Ein fleirnivåanalyse av økono-
misk stemmegiving i høgsterett i tidsrommet 1991–2011’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 
31(4), 278–304.
Skiple, J. K., Grendstad, G., Shaffer, W. R. & Waltenburg, E. N. 2016. ‘Supreme Court Justices’ 
Economic Behaviour: A Multilevel Model Analysis’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 39(1), 
73–94.
Stan Development Team. 2018. ‘RStan: The R interface to Stan’. Available online at: http://mc-
stan.org/
Sunde, J. 2015. Høgsteretts historie 1965–2015. At dømme i sidste instans. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Tate, C. N. 1981. ‘Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of Us Supreme Court 
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978’, American 
Political Science Review, 75(2), 355–67.
Valdini, M. E. & Shortell, C. 2016. ‘Women’s Representation in the Highest Court: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Appointment of Female Justices’, Political Research Quarterly, 
69(4), 865–76.
Voeten, E. 2007. ‘The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the 
European Court of Human Rights’, International Organization, 61(4), 669–701.
von Eyben, W. 1956. ‘Judicial Law making in Scandinavia’, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 5(1), 112–15.
Weiden, D. L. 2011. ‘Judicial Politicization, Ideology, and Activism at the High Courts of the 
United States, Canada, and Australia’, Political Research Quarterly, 64(2), 335–47.
Weinshall, K., Sommer, U. & Ritov, Y. 2018. ‘Ideological Influences on Governance and 
Regulation: The Comparative Case of Supreme Courts’, Regulation & Governance, 12(3), 
334–52.
Wiklund, O.2008. ‘The Reception Process in Sweden and Norway’, in Kellen, H. & Stone Sweet, 
A., eds, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,  165–228.
Windett, J. H., Harden, J. J. & Hall, M. E. K. 2015. ‘Estimating Dynamic Ideal Points for State 
Supreme Courts’, Political Analysis, 23(3), 461–69.
284  Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 43 – No. 4, 2020
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on  
behalf of Nordic Political Science Association
APPENDIX 
Table A1. Ordinary least squares regression models of judicial ideal points as a function of 
personal attributes and career trajectory. Model 4 uses the primary career of each judge 
relative to the baseline category (legal academic); Models 5 and 6 use non-exclusive codings 
of whether each judge has ever worked in a particular role
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Intercept) 0.508 0.219 0.205
(0.381) (0.437) (0.388)
Born in Oslo 0.124 −0.032
(0.283) (0.297)
Career: Attorney (vs. legal academic) −1.064*
(0.471)








Ever an attorney −0.757** −0.680*
(0.279) (0.289)
Ever a judge −0.196 −0.285
(0.314) (0.273)
Ever in government administration 0.072
(0.348)
Ever legal academic 0.615 0.619
(0.404) (0.358)
Ever a government attorney −0.235
(0.303)
Ever in the government legislation dept. 0.069
(0.296)
Ever a public prosecutor −0.098
(0.565)
Num. Obs. 47 46 46
R2 0.216 0.284 0.265
Adj. R2 0.098 0.152 0.151
AIC 132.4 128.1 127.3
BIC 147.2 144.6 142.0
Log. Lik. −58.217 −55.051 −55.666
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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Table A2. Column (1) reports the results of the regression as estimated on all 47 judges. 
Column (2) reports the results of the regression as estimated on 28 judges who were either 





Appoint govt. SD 0.058 0.070
(0.296) (0.465)




Log Lik −63.312 −41.539
AIC 134.623 91.079
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
